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
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
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Regulation and the Casualty Actuary



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The Journal of Insurance Regulation is sponsored by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The objectives of the NAIC in sponsoring the Journal of Insurance Regulation are:

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Time to Dust Off the Anti-Rebate Laws

Jamie Parson* David Marlett** Stuart Powell***

Abstract

Anti-rebate laws were introduced more than 100 years ago, after agents' use of rebates threatened the solvency of life insurance companies and raised questions around unfair discriminatory practices. Supporters of the initial law claimed that they provided market stability, prevented unfair discrimination and kept the focus on the quality of the insurance product versus the size of a rebate. On the other hand, opponents suggest the law infringes upon their rights to competition and stifles innovation. Today, most states have enacted anti-rebate statutes and many have enacted the NAIC model *Unfair Trade Practices Act* (#880). Over time, several of these states have carved exceptions to the anti-rebating law. While many

* Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, Banking & Insurance, Appalachian State University; *andersonja2@appstate.edu*.

** Professor, Department of Finance, Banking & Insurance, Appalachian State University; marlettdc@appstate.edu.

*** Executive in Residence, Brantley Risk and Insurance Center, Appalachian State University.

1. Introduction

"It's time to dust off the anti-rebate laws...and see if they really serve the purpose they were intended to serve when they were put on the books in a totally different age."¹

Rebating occurs when an agent or broker discounts or shares their commission with an insured. Historically, rebates were used in the life insurance industry as an agent's way to induce a customer to purchase a life insurance policy. The first set of laws to regulate this practice were introduced more than 100 years ago, after rebating began to threaten the solvency of life insurance companies and raised questions around unfair discriminatory practices. Rebating is no longer an issue exclusive to life insurance. In fact, agents who sell most insurance products are impacted by anti-rebating laws. Supporters of anti-rebate laws claim it provides market stability by leveling the playing field, preventing unfair discrimination and keeping the focus on the quality of the insurance product versus the size of the rebate. However, opponents argue that current laws are outdated, thereby leaving little room for innovation in marketing and sales. Because of the limitations imposed by the dated laws, they infringe upon a business' right to competition.

Rebating in the marketing of consumer goods is a well-known and widely utilized competitive strategy, both with manufacturers and retailers.² Based on game theory, product rebating is one solution, albeit an inferior one, to a competitive dilemma.³

In every scenario, an individual competitor is made better off by lowering price, but if both competitors lower the price, the profit for each is reduced. Cooperation, without either lowering price, is the optimal outcome, maximizing profits for each. Realistically, however, the two competitors who do better when they cooperate have incentives not to cooperate (or are not allowed to cooperate).

Rebating, if inserted into this dilemma, is simply a form of price reduction. In product rebating, however, the price reduction (and thus the dilemma) is more straightforward than it is for insurance rebating.

Why are the behavioral economics of insurance pricing more complicated

and similarities; and 3) a discussion weighing the options in favor of and against repeal, followed by recommendations for legislatures considering a change to their current laws.

2. History of Anti-Rebate Statutes

Massachusetts was the first state to enact an anti-rebating statute in 1887.⁴ Two years later, New York followed suit with an "anti-discrimination" law, which prohibited discrimination between individuals from the same actuarial class (Conniff, 1986). Within three years, 10 states enacted similar laws and, by the early 1900s, most states enacted some form of an anti-rebate law. These laws were created in response to the then common life insurance practices where agents paid rebates to encourage sales (Sherman and Wen, 2009). This practice often led to agents demanding a higher commission to make up for the rebate they gave the customer, which, in turn, raised a concern for the solvency of the insurer. Additionally, it raised the question of whether this practice resulted in unfair discrimination, as the rebates were not offered consistently to all clients.

While a majority of states embraced th

(Conniff, 1986). In 1990, Florida recodified the law confirming rebating is illegal but provided specific categories of exceptions (Florida Association of Insurance Agents, 2011).

Michigan courts viewed the law differently and upheld the constitutionality of the state's anti-rebate statute. In *Katt v. Commissioner of Insurance*,⁷ the court held the plaintiff failed to show that the anti-rebate laws were "utterly without rational foundation" (Harnett, 2011).

3. Exceptions to the Anti-Rebating Statutes

Although many states have enacted NAIC Model #880, the interpretation of the law varies from state to state. Some states have carved exceptions to the statute through case law, while others have enacted revisions to their statute that list out the exceptions. The remaining states have created exceptions to the anti-rebate statutes through insurance bulletins or advisory opinions. Even though many states

3.3 Raffles

Some states allow an agent or broker to conduct a raffle as long as the entry is not connected to the sale of an insurance product and is within a specific dollar

Journal of Insurance Regulation

In 2014, The Utah Department of Insurance imposed regulation on Zenefits, stating it had to start charging more for its services or face daily fines (Montgomery, 2015). Zenefits saw this as an opportunity to be a trailblazer for technology and its place in the insurance industry. In a 17-page letter to the insurance department, Zenefits' attorney criticized Utah's interpretation of the statute, stating:

Banks routinely offer 'free' checking accounts to customers

Opponents of Senate Bill 5242 argue that the language of the bill precludes a level playing field for agents. Therefore, larger agencies with higher budgets can entice consumers by incentives including innovative technology. If the larger players control the marketplace, it will eliminate competition and as a result have negative consequences on the consumer if the larger entities are able to control pricing. Supporters of the bill contend the anti-rebating laws are supposed to protect consumer, not level the playing field for agents

Opponents also note that while the cost of the value-added services is not directly imposed on the customer, there is a cost associated with offering such a service even in the development and maintenance of the software. Zenefits willingness to absorb the cost and not directly pass on to the insured, can be considered an inducement under NAIC Model #880.

Additionally, services that are not provided by language in the insurance policy are not subject to the regulation of insurance regulators. Therefore, if a consumer does not believe the company is upholding their end of the service contract, their only recourse is through a court system, which can be costly and unrealistic for a small business.

As of October 2017, Senate Bill 5242 has not yet reached the floor in the Senate nor been introduced in the House. In November 2017, an administrative ruling upheld Washington State's order for Zenefits to cease the free distribution of their platform as a violation of the state's rebating laws (Washington OIC Public Affairs, 2017).

4.1 A Call for Change: AretheLines Drawn in the Right Place?

Both sides seem to agree a question exists as to whether the lines as drawn currently by anti-rebating statutes appropriately balance consumer protection with consumer innovation. While there would be a loss of opportunity to enhance consumer experience if innovation is stifled, there is reasonable concern that "lifting the lid" on the statutes could lend itself to borderline unethical practices. However, there is no indication that this technology will be limited to the commercial setting and needs to be addressed in both the personal and commercial setting.

There is a developing rule among states that support an update to the statute. States like Connecticut, North Carolina, and Louisiana have provided guidance through advisory opinions and legal memorandum that preses1 ge2(at)11.2(at)4i3.7((s5017 Natio t)28o 311.4 1)7i


5. Conclusion

Legal conflict frequently is at the core of innovation (Wroldsen, pg. 760, 2016). We have seen this conflict in law and insurance play out in shared economy models such as Uber, Airbnb and, now, Zenefits. Brokers are valuable to most insurance transactions and it is hard to commoditize quality customer service.

Legislatures should be open to carving out an exception that ultimately allows services to go beyond the four corners of the policy, as long as they are related to the functioning of the policy. It is difficult to imagine the industry would not be in support(no)-20

Appendix A

The following tables provide a summa anti-rebating issues. "NG" refers to located in the statute, bulletin, or advi life/health specific statutory references statutory references. "SF" references offers flexibility for innovation platforn to the servicing of the insurance produc




State	Statutory Reference for Anti-Rebating	Promotional Items	Clauddy Class Asterna Inte
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
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Additional Guidance: Montana-North Carolina

Additional Guidance: North Dakota-Texas



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Submissions must be original work and not being considered for publication elsewhere; papers fr(on1n)4.6a7(a)4.6 wheelse omd, 1phov(idetet tota) \$(giver.8cle)a(gy)-1.e ori)47r0(d)-11(t(g)-1. t, wheelse or p documents the sources of information and distinguishes opinions or judgment from empirical or factual information. The paper should recognize contrary views, rebuttals, and opposing positions.

References to published literature should be inserted into the text using the "author, date" format. Examples are: (1) "Manders et al. (1994) have shown. . ." and (2) "Interstate compacts have been researched extensively (Manders et al., 1994)." Cited literature should be shown in a "References" section, containing an alphabetical list of authors as shown below.

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